罗马帝国衰亡史 Vol. 4 · Chapter 44 · Part 6

Chapter XLIV: Idea Of The Roman Jurisprudence.—Part VI. 第四十四章 罗马法学述要——第六节

The relation of guardian and ward, or in Roman words of tutor and pupil, which covers so many titles of the Institutes and Pandects, 136 is of a very simple and uniform nature. The person and property of an orphan must always be trusted to the custody of some discreet friend. If the deceased father had not signified his choice, the agnats, or paternal kindred of the nearest degree, were compelled to act as the natural guardians: the Athenians were apprehensive of exposing the infant to the power of those most interested in his death; but an axiom of Roman jurisprudence has pronounced, that the charge of tutelage should constantly attend the emolument of succession. If the choice of the father, and the line of consanguinity, afforded no efficient guardian, the failure was supplied by the nomination of the praetor of the city, or the president of the province. But the person whom they named to this public office might be legally excused by insanity or blindness, by ignorance or inability, by previous enmity or adverse interest, by the number of children or guardianships with which he was already burdened, and by the immunities which were granted to the useful labors of magistrates, lawyers, physicians, and professors. Till the infant could speak, and think, he was represented by the tutor, whose authority was finally determined by the age of puberty. Without his consent, no act of the pupil could bind himself to his own prejudice, though it might oblige others for his personal benefit. It is needless to observe, that the tutor often gave security, and always rendered an account, and that the want of diligence or integrity exposed him to a civil and almost criminal action for the violation of his sacred trust. The age of puberty had been rashly fixed by the civilians at fourteen; 1361 but as the faculties of the mind ripen more slowly than those of the body, a curator was interposed to guard the fortunes of a Roman youth from his own inexperience and headstrong passions. Such a trustee had been first instituted by the praetor, to save a family from the blind havoc of a prodigal or madman; and the minor was compelled, by the laws, to solicit the same protection, to give validity to his acts till he accomplished the full period of twenty-five years. Women were condemned to the perpetual tutelage of parents, husbands, or guardians; a sex created to please and obey was never supposed to have attained the age of reason and experience. Such, at least, was the stern and haughty spirit of the ancient law, which had been insensibly mollified before the time of Justinian.
监护人与被监护人之间的关系，用罗马人的说法即“监护人（tutor）与受监护人（pupil）”，《法学阶梯》与《学说汇纂》为此设有众多篇目 136，其道理却十分简单而一贯。孤儿的人身与财产，总须托付给某位审慎可靠的亲友照看。倘若亡父生前未曾指定人选，便强令血缘最近的宗亲（即父系亲属）充当当然监护人。雅典人曾顾虑，这样等于把幼儿交到那些最盼他早死之人手中；罗马法学却奉一条准则为不易之理：监护之责应始终随继承之利而行——谁得其产，谁尽其责。若父亲的指定与血亲的顺序都提供不出称职的监护人，便由京城的裁判官或行省长官出面指派，以补此缺。不过，凡受命担此公职者，皆可依法以种种理由请辞：疯癫或失明、无知或无能、与孤儿宿有仇怨或利害相左、名下已有过多子女或监护之累，以及法律为官吏、律师、医师、教授等有益之职所特许的豁免。孩子尚不能言、不能思时，一切由监护人代行；监护人的权限，到孩子达婚龄之年为止。未经监护人同意，受监护人的任何行为，若于己有损便不生效力，若于己有利却能约束他人。监护人往往须提供担保，事后必得交代账目，倘有失于勤勉或不够廉正，便因背弃这份神圣的托付而面临民事乃至近乎刑事的追诉——此皆不待多言。法学家把婚龄草率地定在十四岁 1361；然而心智的成熟远比身体来得迟缓，于是又在其上加设一位监管人（curator），以防罗马青年因自己的少不更事和一意孤行而败坏家产。这种监管人最初由裁判官设立，为的是使一个家族免遭败家子或疯人的盲目摧残；法律更规定，未成年人必须自行申请同样的保护，其行为方才有效，直到年满二十五整岁为止。至于妇女，则被判处终身受父亲、丈夫或监护人的监护：这一性别，天生只为取悦顺从而造，从来算不得已届明理练达之年。至少，古法那副严峻而傲慢的面孔正是如此——不过到查士丁尼之前，它已在不知不觉间变得温和了些。
II. The original right of property can only be justified by the accident or merit of prior occupancy; and on this foundation it is wisely established by the philosophy of the civilians. 137 The savage who hollows a tree, inserts a sharp stone into a wooden handle, or applies a string to an elastic branch, becomes in a state of nature the just proprietor of the canoe, the bow, or the hatchet. The materials were common to all, the new form, the produce of his time and simple industry, belongs solely to himself. His hungry brethren cannot, without a sense of their own injustice, extort from the hunter the game of the forest overtaken or slain by his personal strength and dexterity. If his provident care preserves and multiplies the tame animals, whose nature is tractable to the arts of education, he acquires a perpetual title to the use and service of their numerous progeny, which derives its existence from him alone. If he encloses and cultivates a field for their sustenance and his own, a barren waste is converted into a fertile soil; the seed, the manure, the labor, create a new value, and the rewards of harvest are painfully earned by the fatigues of the revolving year. In the successive states of society, the hunter, the shepherd, the husbandman, may defend their possessions by two reasons which forcibly appeal to the feelings of the human mind: that whatever they enjoy is the fruit of their own industry; and that every man who envies their felicity, may purchase similar acquisitions by the exercise of similar diligence. Such, in truth, may be the freedom and plenty of a small colony cast on a fruitful island. But the colony multiplies, while the space still continues the same; the common rights, the equal inheritance of mankind, are engrossed by the bold and crafty; each field and forest is circumscribed by the landmarks of a jealous master; and it is the peculiar praise of the Roman jurisprudence, that it asserts the claim of the first occupant to the wild animals of the earth, the air, and the waters. In the progress from primitive equity to final injustice, the steps are silent, the shades are almost imperceptible, and the absolute monopoly is guarded by positive laws and artificial reason. The active, insatiate principle of self-love can alone supply the arts of life and the wages of industry; and as soon as civil government and exclusive property have been introduced, they become necessary to the existence of the human race. Except in the singular institutions of Sparta, the wisest legislators have disapproved an agrarian law as a false and dangerous innovation. Among the Romans, the enormous disproportion of wealth surmounted the ideal restraints of a doubtful tradition, and an obsolete statute; a tradition that the poorest follower of Romulus had been endowed with the perpetual inheritance of two jugera; 138 a statute which confined the richest citizen to the measure of five hundred jugera, or three hundred and twelve acres of land. The original territory of Rome consisted only of some miles of wood and meadow along the banks of the Tyber; and domestic exchange could add nothing to the national stock. But the goods of an alien or enemy were lawfully exposed to the first hostile occupier; the city was enriched by the profitable trade of war; and the blood of her sons was the only price that was paid for the Volscian sheep, the slaves of Briton, or the gems and gold of Asiatic kingdoms. In the language of ancient jurisprudence, which was corrupted and forgotten before the age of Justinian, these spoils were distinguished by the name of manceps or manicipium, taken with the hand; and whenever they were sold or emancipated, the purchaser required some assurance that they had been the property of an enemy, and not of a fellow-citizen. 139 A citizen could only forfeit his rights by apparent dereliction, and such dereliction of a valuable interest could not easily be presumed. Yet, according to the Twelve Tables, a prescription of one year for movables, and of two years for immovables, abolished the claim of the ancient master, if the actual possessor had acquired them by a fair transaction from the person whom he believed to be the lawful proprietor. 140 Such conscientious injustice, without any mixture of fraud or force could seldom injure the members of a small republic; but the various periods of three, of ten, or of twenty years, determined by Justinian, are more suitable to the latitude of a great empire. It is only in the term of prescription that the distinction of real and personal fortune has been remarked by the civilians; and their general idea of property is that of simple, uniform, and absolute dominion. The subordinate exceptions of use, of usufruct, 141 of servitude, 142 imposed for the benefit of a neighbor on lands and houses, are abundantly explained by the professors of jurisprudence. The claims of property, as far as they are altered by the mixture, the division, or the transformation of substances, are investigated with metaphysical subtilty by the same civilians.
二、财产权的最初根据，只能来自先占——或出于偶然，或凭借功劳；法学家的哲理正是明智地把它奠基于此。137野蛮人把树干掏空、把利石嵌上木柄、把弦绷在有弹力的枝条上，在自然状态中便正当地成了那独木舟、那弓、那斧的主人。材料本为众人所共有，可那新的形制，出自他自己的光阴与朴拙的劳作，便唯独归他一人。他那些饥肠辘辘的同类，若想从这猎人手中夺走林中猎物——那是靠他一己的气力与灵巧追及并击杀的——就不能不自觉理亏。牲畜天性驯良，可以调教；他若悉心照料，使之存活繁衍，便对其众多后代的使用与役使取得永久的权利，因为那些后代的存在全出于他一人。他若圈起一块田地耕种，以养牲畜、养自己，荒芜之地便化为沃土；种子、粪肥、劳力共同创出新的价值，一年四季的辛劳换来收获的酬报，得来何其艰辛。在社会依次演进的各个阶段，猎人、牧人、农夫都可用两条深深打动人心的理由来护卫自己的产业：其一，凡他们所享有的，皆是自身勤劳的果实；其二，任何人若艳羡他们的富足，也尽可以同样的勤勉去挣得同样的所得。一小群人流落到一座丰饶的海岛上，其自由与富足，确乎可以如此。但人口日繁，土地却仍是那么多；本属全人类共有、人人可均分的公共权利，遂被胆大而狡黠者攫为己有；每一片田野、每一座林子，都被猜忌的主人用界石圈了起来。罗马法学尤有一点值得称道：凡陆上、空中、水中的野生动物，谁最先捕获，法律便承认其归属于谁。从原始的公平一步步走向最终的不公，脚步无声，明暗之间几乎难以察觉，而那绝对的垄断，终由成文法律与人为的道理牢牢守护着。唯有自爱这一活跃而永不知足的本原，才能催生种种谋生之术、才能给勤劳以报偿；而文明的治理与排他的私产一经确立，便为人类存续所不可或缺。除斯巴达那套独特的制度外，最贤明的立法者都不赞成“均田法”，视之为虚妄而危险的新花样。在罗马，贫富之间的悬殊极大，早已冲破了一项可疑传说与一条久已废弛的成文法所设的那点虚幻约束。那传说称，罗慕路斯麾下最穷的追随者当年也分得两犹格拉土地作为永业 138；那法令则规定，最富的公民也不得占地超过五百犹格拉，合三百一十二英亩。罗马最初的疆土，不过是台伯河两岸几英里的林地与草场；国内的彼此交易，丝毫无从增益举国的财富总量。但外邦人或敌人的财物，依法可任由第一个以敌意占取者据为己有；这座城市靠着战争这桩有利可图的买卖而日渐富庶；无论是沃尔西人的羊群、不列颠的奴隶，还是亚细亚列国的珠宝与黄金，罗马为之付出的唯一代价，只是自家子弟的鲜血。古法学的术语在查士丁尼时代之前早已讹变、湮没；按那套术语，这类战利品另有专称，叫做 manceps 或 manicipium，意即“以手取得之物”；每逢转卖或让渡，买主总要索取某种保证，确认其原属敌人所有，而非某位同胞公民之物。139公民要丧失自己的权利，只能是明显的弃置不顾；而对一项有价值的利益，这种弃置是不能轻易推定的。不过，按照《十二铜表法》，动产满一年、不动产满两年，只要现在的占有人是经由公平交易、从他所相信的合法所有者手中取得该物，原主的权利主张便告消灭。140这种问心无愧的“不公”，既不掺杂欺诈，也不夹带强暴，在一个小小的共和国里很少会损及其成员；而查士丁尼所定的三年、十年、二十年等不同期限，则更适合一个疆域辽阔的大帝国。法学家唯有在时效期限这一点上，才留意到不动产与动产之别；至于他们对财产的总体观念，则是一种简单、划一而绝对的支配权。至于使用权、用益权 141、地役权 142 等次一级的例外——它们为邻人之便而加于田地与房屋之上——法学教授们已有充分的阐说。财产权因物质的混合、分割或形态变换而发生的种种变动，也由这些法学家以近乎形而上学的精微加以探究。
The personal title of the first proprietor must be determined by his death: but the possession, without any appearance of change, is peaceably continued in his children, the associates of his toil, and the partners of his wealth. This natural inheritance has been protected by the legislators of every climate and age, and the father is encouraged to persevere in slow and distant improvements, by the tender hope, that a long posterity will enjoy the fruits of his labor. The principle of hereditary succession is universal; but the order has been variously established by convenience or caprice, by the spirit of national institutions, or by some partial example which was originally decided by fraud or violence. The jurisprudence of the Romans appear to have deviated from the inequality of nature much less than the Jewish, 143 the Athenian, 144 or the English institutions. 145 On the death of a citizen, all his descendants, unless they were already freed from his paternal power, were called to the inheritance of his possessions. The insolent prerogative of primogeniture was unknown; the two sexes were placed on a just level; all the sons and daughters were entitled to an equal portion of the patrimonial estate; and if any of the sons had been intercepted by a premature death, his person was represented, and his share was divided, by his surviving children. On the failure of the direct line, the right of succession must diverge to the collateral branches. The degrees of kindred 146 are numbered by the civilians, ascending from the last possessor to a common parent, and descending from the common parent to the next heir: my father stands in the first degree, my brother in the second, his children in the third, and the remainder of the series may be conceived by a fancy, or pictured in a genealogical table. In this computation, a distinction was made, essential to the laws and even the constitution of Rome; the agnats, or persons connected by a line of males, were called, as they stood in the nearest degree, to an equal partition; but a female was incapable of transmitting any legal claims; and the cognats of every rank, without excepting the dear relation of a mother and a son, were disinherited by the Twelve Tables, as strangers and aliens. Among the Romans agens or lineage was united by a common name and domestic rites; the various cognomens or surnames of Scipio, or Marcellus, distinguished from each other the subordinate branches or families of the Cornelian or Claudian race: the default of the agnats, of the same surname, was supplied by the larger denomination of gentiles; and the vigilance of the laws maintained, in the same name, the perpetual descent of religion and property. A similar principle dictated the Voconian law, 147 which abolished the right of female inheritance. As long as virgins were given or sold in marriage, the adoption of the wife extinguished the hopes of the daughter. But the equal succession of independent matrons supported their pride and luxury, and might transport into a foreign house the riches of their fathers.
最初所有者的个人权利，必随其死亡而终结；然而那份产业却毫无更易的迹象，安然延续到他的子女手中——他们本就是他劳作的伙伴、他财富的分享者。这种天然的继承，古今各地的立法者都加以保护；做父亲的怀着一线温情的期望——但愿子孙绵延，长享他劳作的果实——便有心去经营那些见效缓慢、收益遥远的产业。世袭继承的原则放之四海而皆准，但继承的次序却因地而异：或出于便利，或出于任性，或本乎各民族制度的精神，或源自某个最初由欺诈与暴力所定下的偏私先例。就背离自然亲疏之常而论，罗马法学似乎远比犹太 143、雅典 144 或英格兰的制度 145 来得轻微。一位公民身故时，他的全体直系子孙——除非已脱离其父权管辖——都被召来继承他的产业。长子独尊那种蛮横的特权，在此闻所未闻；男女两性一律平等；诸子诸女对祖产都有权均分一份；倘有某个儿子早夭，便由他遗下的子女代其位、分其份。直系一脉若已无人，继承权便须转向旁系。法学家为亲等 146 排定次第：先从最后的所有者上溯到共同的先祖，再从共同的先祖下推到最近的继承人。以我而论，父亲居第一等，兄弟居第二等，兄弟的子女居第三等，其余各等，或凭想象揣度，或画成一幅家谱便可一目了然。这套算法中有一处区分，对罗马的法律乃至政制都至关紧要：宗亲（agnati，即凭男系相连之人）按其亲等远近被召来均分遗产；而女子却不能传递任何法定的权利主张，于是各等血亲（cognati）——连母子这样亲密的关系也不例外——都被《十二铜表法》当作外人另类，摒于继承之外。在罗马人中，一个氏族（gens，即家系）靠共同的姓氏与家祭而结为一体；西庇阿、马塞勒斯等各色族称或姓氏，把科尔涅利乌斯氏族或克劳狄乌斯氏族之下的支系与家庭彼此区分开来。同姓宗亲若已断绝，便由范围更大的“同宗族人”（gentiles）来递补；法律警觉地守护着，务使宗教与财产在同一姓氏之内世代相传，永不旁落。《沃科尼亚法》147 出于类似的原则，废除了女子的继承权。只要女子仍是被许配或卖与他人为妻，她一旦以妻子的身份归入夫家，做女儿的那点继承指望便随之熄灭。可是，一旦独立自主的妇人也能平等继承，便助长了她们的骄矜与奢靡，还可能把父亲的财富转手带进外姓人家。
While the maxims of Cato 148 were revered, they tended to perpetuate in each family a just and virtuous mediocrity: till female blandishments insensibly triumphed; and every salutary restraint was lost in the dissolute greatness of the republic. The rigor of the decemvirs was tempered by the equity of the praetors. Their edicts restored and emancipated posthumous children to the rights of nature; and upon the failure of the agnats, they preferred the blood of the cognats to the name of the gentiles whose title and character were insensibly covered with oblivion. The reciprocal inheritance of mothers and sons was established in the Tertullian and Orphitian decrees by the humanity of the senate. A new and more impartial order was introduced by the Novels of Justinian, who affected to revive the jurisprudence of the Twelve Tables. The lines of masculine and female kindred were confounded: the descending, ascending, and collateral series was accurately defined; and each degree, according to the proximity of blood and affection, succeeded to the vacant possessions of a Roman citizen. 149
只要加图 148 的格言还受人尊崇，各家各户就大抵能守住一种正当而有德的中庸之境；直到女子的柔媚软语于不知不觉间占了上风，那一切有益的约束，便都消失在共和国那放纵无度的煊赫之中。十人立法团的严苛，赖裁判官的衡平之道得以缓和。裁判官的告示使遗腹子重获自然赋予的权利，还其自由之身；一旦宗亲断绝，他们宁取血亲（cognati）的血缘，而不取“同宗族人”（gentiles）的名分——后者的名号与身份，早已在不知不觉间湮没无闻。元老院本着仁厚之心，颁行《特尔图良决议》与《奥菲提乌斯决议》，确立了母子之间可以相互继承。查士丁尼的《新律》又引入了一套更为公允的新次序，他俨然以复兴《十二铜表法》的法理自命。男系与女系的亲属不再分别对待，浑然合为一体；卑亲、尊亲与旁系三条脉络都被精确界定；每一亲等，依血缘与情分的亲疏，依次继承一位罗马公民身后所遗的产业。149
The order of succession is regulated by nature, or at least by the general and permanent reason of the lawgiver: but this order is frequently violated by the arbitrary and partial wills, which prolong the dominion of the testator beyond the grave. 150 In the simple state of society, this last use or abuse of the right of property is seldom indulged: it was introduced at Athens by the laws of Solon; and the private testaments of the father of a family are authorized by the Twelve Tables. Before the time of the decemvirs, 151 a Roman citizen exposed his wishes and motives to the assembly of the thirty curiae or parishes, and the general law of inheritance was suspended by an occasional act of the legislature. After the permission of the decemvirs, each private lawgiver promulgated his verbal or written testament in the presence of five citizens, who represented the five classes of the Roman people; a sixth witness attested their concurrence; a seventh weighed the copper money, which was paid by an imaginary purchaser; and the estate was emancipated by a fictitious sale and immediate release. This singular ceremony, 152 which excited the wonder of the Greeks, was still practised in the age of Severus; but the praetors had already approved a more simple testament, for which they required the seals and signatures of seven witnesses, free from all legal exception, and purposely summoned for the execution of that important act. A domestic monarch, who reigned over the lives and fortunes of his children, might distribute their respective shares according to the degrees of their merit or his affection; his arbitrary displeasure chastised an unworthy son by the loss of his inheritance, and the mortifying preference of a stranger. But the experience of unnatural parents recommended some limitations of their testamentary powers. A son, or, by the laws of Justinian, even a daughter, could no longer be disinherited by their silence: they were compelled to name the criminal, and to specify the offence; and the justice of the emperor enumerated the sole causes that could justify such a violation of the first principles of nature and society. 153 Unless a legitimate portion, a fourth part, had been reserved for the children, they were entitled to institute an action or complaint of inofficious testament; to suppose that their father’s understanding was impaired by sickness or age; and respectfully to appeal from his rigorous sentence to the deliberate wisdom of the magistrate. In the Roman jurisprudence, an essential distinction was admitted between the inheritance and the legacies. The heirs who succeeded to the entire unity, or to any of the twelve fractions of the substance of the testator, represented his civil and religious character, asserted his rights, fulfilled his obligations, and discharged the gifts of friendship or liberality, which his last will had bequeathed under the name of legacies. But as the imprudence or prodigality of a dying man might exhaust the inheritance, and leave only risk and labor to his successor, he was empowered to retain the Falcidian portion; to deduct, before the payment of the legacies, a clear fourth for his own emolument. A reasonable time was allowed to examine the proportion between the debts and the estate, to decide whether he should accept or refuse the testament; and if he used the benefit of an inventory, the demands of the creditors could not exceed the valuation of the effects. The last will of a citizen might be altered during his life, or rescinded after his death: the persons whom he named might die before him, or reject the inheritance, or be exposed to some legal disqualification. In the contemplation of these events, he was permitted to substitute second and third heirs, to replace each other according to the order of the testament; and the incapacity of a madman or an infant to bequeath his property might be supplied by a similar substitution. 154 But the power of the testator expired with the acceptance of the testament: each Roman of mature age and discretion acquired the absolute dominion of his inheritance, and the simplicity of the civil law was never clouded by the long and intricate entails which confine the happiness and freedom of unborn generations.
继承的次序由自然定夺，至少也由立法者那普遍而恒久的理性定夺；然而这一次序却屡屡被专断而偏私的遗嘱所破坏——立遗嘱者借此把自己的支配之权一直延伸到坟墓的那一边。150在朴素的社会状态里，财产权的这最后一种用途——或曰滥用——是很少被纵容的；它由梭伦的法律引入雅典，而一家之父的私人遗嘱，则由《十二铜表法》赋予效力。在十人立法团之前 151，一位罗马公民须把自己的意愿与理由陈于三十个库里亚（即区）组成的民会之前，靠立法机关这一临时之举，将通行的继承法暂时搁置。自十人立法团许可之后，每一位为自己立法的私人，都可当着五位公民的面公布口头或书面的遗嘱——那五人代表罗马人民的五个等级；第六位见证人证明众人一致同意；第七位则称量铜钱，由一名假想的买主付出；于是那份产业便经由一桩虚拟的买卖与当场的交割而完成让渡。这套奇特的仪式 152 曾令希腊人啧啧称奇，直到塞维鲁的时代仍在沿用；不过裁判官早已认可了一种更为简便的遗嘱，只要求七名见证人盖章签名即可——这些人须在法律上无可指摘，且是专为办理这桩要事而特意召来的。一家之主，宛如君临子女性命与家财之上的君王，尽可按子女各自的贤愚、或按自己偏爱的深浅来分派份额；他若专断地心生不悦，便可褫夺不肖之子的继承权，转而把产业给予外人，让那儿子蒙受这难堪的偏废之辱。但有些父母的悖情之举，使人觉得对这遗嘱之权还须加些限制。儿子——依查士丁尼的法律，甚至女儿——都不能再因遗嘱中只字不提而被剥夺继承权了：立遗嘱者必须指名点出那“罪人”，并载明其过犯；而皇帝秉持公道，一一列明唯有哪几种缘由方足以为这般违背自然与社会首要原则之举辩护。153除非已为子女留下法定的份额——即四分之一——否则子女便有权提起诉讼，控告遗嘱“有悖天伦”；他们可以推说父亲的神智已因病痛或年迈而受损，进而恭敬地请求：不服从父亲那严酷的裁断，转而诉诸官长审慎周详的明断。罗马法学承认“继承”与“遗赠”之间有一处根本的区别。继承人所承受的，或是立遗嘱者全部家产的整体，或是其中十二分之几的份额；他们代表死者在民事与宗教上的身份，主张其权利，履行其义务，并把他遗嘱中以“遗赠”名义所留下的、出于友谊或慷慨的馈赠一一发付。但临终之人若失于谨慎、或挥霍无度，遗产恐被掏空，只给继承人留下风险与劳累；故而法律准许继承人保留“法尔奇迪份额”，即在支付各项遗赠之前，先划出净四分之一归自己所得。法律还留给继承人一段合理的时间，去核算债务与遗产之间的比例，以决定该接受还是拒绝这份遗嘱；他若援用“财产清册”的优待，债权人的索求便不得超过所列财物的估值。公民的遗嘱，生前可以更改，身后也可以撤废；他所指定的人，可能先他而死，可能拒绝继承，也可能因某种法律上的资格欠缺而不能承受。有鉴于这些变故，法律准许他设立第二、第三顺位的替补继承人，依遗嘱所定的次序彼此递补；至于疯人或幼儿无力处分自家财产，也可用类似的替补之法来补足。154不过，遗嘱一经承受，立遗嘱者的权力便告终结：凡年岁已长、明达事理的罗马人，都对自己所继承的产业取得绝对的支配权；市民法那份简明，从不曾被冗长繁复的“限嗣继承”所遮蔽——正是那种限嗣之制，束缚了尚未出世之人的幸福与自由。
Conquest and the formalities of law established the use of codicils. If a Roman was surprised by death in a remote province of the empire, he addressed a short epistle to his legitimate or testamentary heir; who fulfilled with honor, or neglected with impunity, this last request, which the judges before the age of Augustus were not authorized to enforce. A codicil might be expressed in any mode, or in any language; but the subscription of five witnesses must declare that it was the genuine composition of the author. His intention, however laudable, was sometimes illegal; and the invention of fidei-commissa, or trusts, arose from the struggle between natural justice and positive jurisprudence. A stranger of Greece or Africa might be the friend or benefactor of a childless Roman, but none, except a fellow-citizen, could act as his heir. The Voconian law, which abolished female succession, restrained the legacy or inheritance of a woman to the sum of one hundred thousand sesterces; 155 and an only daughter was condemned almost as an alien in her father’s house. The zeal of friendship, and parental affection, suggested a liberal artifice: a qualified citizen was named in the testament, with a prayer or injunction that he would restore the inheritance to the person for whom it was truly intended. Various was the conduct of the trustees in this painful situation: they had sworn to observe the laws of their country, but honor prompted them to violate their oath; and if they preferred their interest under the mask of patriotism, they forfeited the esteem of every virtuous mind. The declaration of Augustus relieved their doubts, gave a legal sanction to confidential testaments and codicils, and gently unravelled the forms and restraints of the republican jurisprudence. 156 But as the new practice of trusts degenerated into some abuse, the trustee was enabled, by the Trebellian and Pegasian decrees, to reserve one fourth of the estate, or to transfer on the head of the real heir all the debts and actions of the succession. The interpretation of testaments was strict and literal; but the language of trusts and codicils was delivered from the minute and technical accuracy of the civilians. 157
帝国的开疆拓土，连同法律程式的种种讲究，共同促成了“遗嘱附录”（codicilli）的使用。一个罗马人若在帝国某个偏远行省猝然遇死，便给他的法定继承人或遗嘱继承人写下一封短信；对这最后的嘱托，继承人守信照办固然体面，置之不理也不受追究——因为在奥古斯都之前，法官本无权强制执行。这种附录，用什么方式、什么语言写成都可以，但必须有五位见证人签名，证明它确是本人亲笔所拟。立嘱人的用意纵然可嘉，有时却于法不合；“信托遗赠”（fidei-commissa，即托付）之法，正是在自然正义与成文法学的角力中应运而生。一个来自希腊或非洲的异邦人，尽可以是某位无嗣罗马人的挚友或恩公，然而除同胞公民外，谁也不能充当他的继承人。《沃科尼亚法》既废除了女子的继承权，又把女子所受的遗赠或遗产限死在十万塞斯特斯以内 155；即便是独生女，在自己父亲的家里也几乎被当作外人看待。出于友谊的热忱与为人父母的舐犊之情，人们想出一条通融的巧计：在遗嘱中指定一位合格的公民为继承人，同时附上恳请或嘱咐，要他把遗产转交给那真正的意中受益人。受托人身处这两难之境，行事各各不同：他们曾立誓遵守本国法律，而信义又催他们背弃这誓言；若有人假爱国之名、行自利之实，便丧尽了一切正直之士的敬重。奥古斯都的一纸敕令解开了他们的疑虑，赋予这类基于信任的遗嘱与附录以法律效力，并把共和时代法学那些繁文缛节与重重约束轻轻疏解开来。156但信托这一新做法后来渐生流弊，于是《特雷贝利乌斯决议》与《佩加索斯决议》准许受托人留下遗产的四分之一，或将继承所附带的一切债务与讼累尽数转到真正继承人的头上。对遗嘱的解释，向来严格而拘泥字面；至于信托与附录的措辞，则不必受法学家那种锱铢必较、拘于术语的精确所束缚。157

Notes 注释

136 ↩
See the article of guardians and wards in the Institutes, (l. i. tit. xiii.—xxvi.,) the Pandects, (l. xxvi. xxvii.,) and the Code, (l. v. tit. xxviii.—lxx.)
关于监护人与被监护人一目，参见《法学阶梯》（第一卷第十三至二十六题）、《学说汇纂》（第二十六、二十七卷）及《法典》（第五卷第二十八至七十题）。
1361 ↩
Gibbon accuses the civilians of having “rashly fixed the age of puberty at twelve or fourteen years.” It was not so; before Justinian, no law existed on this subject. Ulpian relates the discussions which took place on this point among the different sects of civilians. See the Institutes, l. i. tit. 22, and the fragments of Ulpian. Nor was the curatorship obligatory for all minors.—W.
吉本指责法学家“把婚龄草率地定在十二岁或十四岁”。其实不然：在查士丁尼之前，此事本无成文法可言。乌尔比安记述过法学家各派就此争论的情形。参见《法学阶梯》第一卷第二十二题及乌尔比安的残篇。何况监管人之设，对一切未成年人也并非一律强制。—W
137 ↩
Institut. l. ii. tit i. ii. Compare the pure and precise reasoning of Caius and Heineccius (l. ii. tit. i. p. 69-91) with the loose prolixity of Theophilus, (p. 207—265.) The opinions of Ulpian are preserved in the Pandects, (l. i. tit. viii. leg. 41, No. 1.)
《法学阶梯》第二卷第一、二题。可将盖尤斯与海涅克丘斯（第二卷第一题，第69—91页）那纯净精确的推理，与塞奥菲鲁斯（第207—265页）的松散冗赘相对照。乌尔比安的见解则保存于《学说汇纂》（第一卷第八题第41条第1目）。
138 ↩
The heredium of the first Romans is defined by Varro, (de Re Rustica, l. i. c. ii. p. 141, c. x. p. 160, 161, edit. Gesner,) and clouded by Pliny’s declamation, (Hist. Natur. xviii. 2.) A just and learned comment is given in the Administration des Terres chez les Romains, (p. 12—66.) Note: On the duo jugera, compare Niebuhr, vol. i. p. 337.—M.
最早罗马人的“祖传份地”（heredium），瓦罗曾在《论农事》（de Re Rustica，第一卷第二章第141页、第十章第160、161页，格斯纳校本）中加以界说，却又被普林尼的夸饰之辞（《博物志》第十八卷第2节）弄得含糊不清。《罗马人的土地管理》（Administration des Terres chez les Romains，第12—66页）一书对此有公允而博洽的评述。按：关于“两犹格拉”（duo jugera），可参尼布尔《罗马史》第一卷第337页。—M
139 ↩
The res mancipi is explained from faint and remote lights by Ulpian (Fragment. tit. xviii. p. 618, 619) and Bynkershoek, (Opp tom. i. p. 306—315.) The definition is somewhat arbitrary; and as none except myself have assigned a reason, I am diffident of my own.
关于 res mancipi（要式物），乌尔比安（《残篇》第十八题，第618、619页）与宾克斯胡克（《文集》第一卷，第306—315页）只借着一点微弱而遥远的光亮加以解说。这一定义多少有些武断；而除我之外，从没有人为它给出过理由，因此对自己的这套说法，我也不无疑虑。
140 ↩
From this short prescription, Hume (Essays, vol. i. p. 423) infers that there could not then be more order and settlement in Italy than now amongst the Tartars. By the civilian of his adversary Wallace, he is reproached, and not without reason, for overlooking the conditions, (Institut. l. ii. tit. vi.) * Note: Gibbon acknowledges, in the former note, the obscurity of his views with regard to the res mancipi. The interpreters, who preceded him, are not agreed on this point, one of the most difficult in the ancient Roman law. The conclusions of Hume, of which the author here speaks, are grounded on false assumptions. Gibbon had conceived very inaccurate notions of Property among the Romans, and those of many authors in the present day are not less erroneous. We think it right, in this place, to develop the system of property among the Romans, as the result of the study of the extant original authorities on the ancient law, and as it has been demonstrated, recognized, and adopted by the most learned expositors of the Roman law. Besides the authorities formerly known, such as the Fragments of Ulpian, t. xix. and t. i. 16. Theoph. Paraph. i. 5, 4, may be consulted the Institutes of Gaius, i. 54, and ii. 40, et seq. The Roman laws protected all property acquired in a lawful manner. They imposed on those who had invaded it, the obligation of making restitution and reparation of all damage caused by that invasion; they punished it moreover, in many cases, by a pecuniary fine. But they did not always grant a recovery against the third person, who had become bona fide possessed of the property. He who had obtained possession of a thing belonging to another, knowing nothing of the prior rights of that person, maintained the possession. The law had expressly determined those cases, in which it permitted property to be reclaimed from an innocent possessor. In these cases possession had the characters of absolute proprietorship, called mancipium, jus Quiritium. To possess this right, it was not sufficient to have entered into possession of the thing in any manner; the acquisition was bound to have that character of publicity, which was given by the observation of solemn forms, prescribed by the laws, or the uninterrupted exercise of proprietorship during a certain time: the Roman citizen alone could acquire this proprietorship. Every other kind of possession, which might be named imperfect proprietorship, was called “in bonis habere.” It was not till after the time of Cicero that the general name of Dominium was given to all proprietorship. It was then the publicity which constituted the distinctive character of absolute dominion. This publicity was grounded on the mode of acquisition, which the moderns have called Civil, (Modi adquirendi Civiles.) These modes of acquisition were, 1. Mancipium or mancipatio, which was nothing but the solemn delivering over of the thing in the presence of a determinate number of witnesses and a public officer; it was from this probably that proprietorship was named, 2. In jure cessio, which was a solemn delivering over before the praetor. 3. Adjudicatio, made by a judge, in a case of partition. 4. Lex, which comprehended modes of acquiring in particular cases determined by law; probably the law of the xii. tables; for instance, the sub corona emptio and the legatum. 5. Usna, called afterwards usacapio, and by the moderns prescription. This was only a year for movables; two years for things not movable. Its primary object was altogether different from that of prescription in the present day. It was originally introduced in order to transform the simple possession of a thing (in bonis habere) into Roman proprietorship. The public and uninterrupted possession of a thing, enjoyed for the space of one or two years, was sufficient to make known to the inhabitants of the city of Rome to whom the thing belonged. This last mode of acquisition completed the system of civil acquisitions. by legalizing. as it were, every other kind of acquisition which was not conferred, from the commencement, by the Jus Quiritium. V. Ulpian. Fragm. i. 16. Gaius, ii. 14. We believe, according to Gaius, 43, that this usucaption was extended to the case where a thing had been acquired from a person not the real proprietor; and that according to the time prescribed, it gave to the possessor the Roman proprietorship. But this does not appear to have been the original design of this Institution. Caeterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis competit, quae non a domino nobis tradita fuerint, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus Gaius, l ii. 43. As to things of smaller value, or those which it was difficult to distinguish from each other, the solemnities of which we speak were not requisite to obtain legal proprietorship. In this case simple delivery was sufficient. In proportion to the aggrandizement of the Republic, this latter principle became more important from the increase of the commerce and wealth of the state. It was necessary to know what were those things of which absolute property might be acquired by simple delivery, and what, on the contrary, those, the acquisition of which must be sanctioned by these solemnities. This question was necessarily to be decided by a general rule; and it is this rule which establishes the distinction between res mancipi and nec mancipi, a distinction about which the opinions of modern civilians differ so much that there are above ten conflicting systems on the subject. The system which accords best with a sound interpretation of the Roman laws, is that proposed by M. Trekel of Hamburg, and still further developed by M. Hugo, who has extracted it in the Magazine of Civil Law, vol. ii. p. 7. This is the system now almost universally adopted. Res mancipi (by contraction for mancipii) were things of which the absolute property (Jus Quiritium) might be acquired only by the solemnities mentioned above, at least by that of mancipation, which was, without doubt, the most easy and the most usual. Gaius, ii. 25. As for other things, the acquisition of which was not subject to these forms, in order to confer absolute right, they were called res nec mancipi. See Ulpian, Fragm. xix. 1. 3, 7. Ulpian and Varro enumerate the different kinds of res mancipi. Their enumerations do not quite agree; and various methods of reconciling them have been attempted. The authority of Ulpian, however, who wrote as a civilian, ought to have the greater weight on this subject. But why are these things alone res mancipi? This is one of the questions which have been most frequently agitated, and on which the opinions of civilians are most divided. M. Hugo has resolved it in the most natural and satisfactory manner. “All things which were easily known individually, which were of great value, with which the Romans were acquainted, and which they highly appreciated, were res mancipi. Of old mancipation or some other solemn form was required for the acquisition of these things, an account of their importance. Mancipation served to prove their acquisition, because they were easily distinguished one from the other.” On this great historical discussion consult the Magazine of Civil Law by M. Hugo, vol. ii. p. 37, 38; the dissertation of M. J. M. Zachariae, de Rebus Mancipi et nec Mancipi Conjecturae, p. 11. Lipsiae, 1807; the History of Civil Law by M. Hugo; and my Institutiones Juris Romani Privati p. 108, 110. As a general rule, it may be said that all things are res nec mancipi; the res mancipi are the exception to this principle. The praetors changed the system of property by allowing a person, who had a thing in bonis, the right to recover before the prescribed term of usucaption had conferred absolute proprietorship. (Pauliana in rem actio.) Justinian went still further, in times when there was no longer any distinction between a Roman citizen and a stranger. He granted the right of recovering all things which had been acquired, whether by what were called civil or natural modes of acquisition, Cod. l. vii. t. 25, 31. And he so altered the theory of Gaius in his Institutes, ii. 1, that no trace remains of the doctrine taught by that civilian.—W.
休谟据这样短的时效期限（《随笔集》第一卷第423页）推断：当时意大利的秩序与安定，未必胜过如今鞑靼人中间的情形。他的论敌华莱士援引法学（《法学阶梯》第二卷第六题）予以责难，说他忽略了其中的种种条件——这责难不无道理。* 按：吉本在前一条注中已承认，自己对 res mancipi（要式物）的看法含糊不清。在他之前的诠释者，对这一点也众说纷纭——它本是古罗马法中最难解的问题之一。作者此处所引休谟的结论，是建立在错误的假定之上的。吉本对罗马人的财产制度所形成的观念极不准确，而今日许多作者的观念，谬误也不遑多让。我们以为，不妨就在此处，把罗马人的财产制度梳理出来——这既是研读古法现存原始文献所得的结论，也是罗马法最渊博的诠释者们所论证、公认并采纳的定说。除素来为人所知的文献——如乌尔比安《残篇》第十九题及第一题第16节、塞奥菲鲁斯《释义》（Theoph. Paraph.）第一卷5,4——之外，还可参阅盖尤斯《法学阶梯》第一卷54节、第二卷40节及其以下。罗马法律保护一切以合法方式取得的财产。凡侵夺他人财产者，法律课以返还之责，并令其赔偿因侵夺而造成的一切损害；此外，在许多情形下，还处以罚金。但对于善意（bona fide）取得该财产的第三人，法律却并不总是准许原主追回。凡取得他人之物者，若对该人先前的权利一无所知，便可保有其占有。法律明确规定了哪些情形准许从无辜的占有人手中索回财物。唯有在这些情形下，占有才具有绝对所有权的性质，称为 mancipium（要式所有权），亦即 jus Quiritium（奎里蒂法所有权）。要享有这一权利，仅仅以某种方式占有该物是不够的；其取得还必须具备“公开性”这一特征，而公开性或来自遵行法律所定的庄严程式，或来自在一定期间内不间断地行使所有权。唯有罗马公民才能取得这种所有权。其余种种占有，可称为“不完全所有权”，名曰 in bonis habere（列于财产之中，即事实上的持有）。直到西塞罗之后，Dominium（所有权）这一总称才被用于一切所有权。可见，构成绝对支配权（dominium）之独特标志的，正是这种公开性；而公开性又植根于取得的方式，即近人所谓“市民法上的取得方式”（Modi adquirendi Civiles）。这些取得方式计有：一、Mancipium 或 mancipatio（要式买卖），无非是当着一定人数的见证人与一名公职人员之面，郑重地把物交付出去——所有权之名，或许正由此而来。二、In jure cessio（法庭让与），即在裁判官面前庄严交付。三、Adjudicatio（判归），由法官在分产案件中作出。四、Lex（依法取得），概指法律为特定情形所定的种种取得方式，大约出自《十二铜表法》，例如 sub corona emptio（战俘拍卖之买）与 legatum（遗赠）。五、Usna（应作 usus，即“使用”），后称 usacapio（即 usucapio，取得时效），近人则称之为“时效取得”。这种取得，动产只需一年，不动产则需两年。它最初的目的，与今日的时效制度全然不同：其本意是要把对一物的单纯占有（in bonis habere）转化为罗马式的所有权。对一物公开而不间断地占有一两年，就足以让罗马城的居民知晓此物归谁所有。这最后一种取得方式，使市民法上的取得体系臻于完备——它仿佛为其余一切并非自始即由 Jus Quiritium（奎里蒂法）所授予的取得，都补上了合法的资格。参见乌尔比安《残篇》第一题第16节、盖尤斯第二卷14节。据盖尤斯第43节，我们相信：这种取得时效后来也延及从非真正所有者手中取得某物的情形，并依所定期限而赋予占有人以罗马所有权。但这似乎并非该制度最初的设计。Caeterum etiam earum rerum usucapio nobis competit, quae non a domino nobis tradita fuerint, si modo eas bona fide acceperimus（“此外，凡非由所有者交付于我们之物，只要我们系善意受领，其取得时效亦归我们所有”）——盖尤斯第二卷43节。至于价值较小之物，或彼此难以区分之物，欲取得合法所有权，并不需要上文所说的那些庄严程式；这种情形下，单纯的交付即已足够。随着共和国日益强盛、工商与财富日增，后一原则也愈显重要。人们必须弄清：哪些物件可凭单纯交付即取得绝对所有权，哪些物件反之，其取得非经这些庄严程式认可不可。这个问题势必要用一条通则来裁断；而正是这条通则，划定了 res mancipi（要式物）与 res nec mancipi（略式物）之别。近代法学家对这一区分聚讼纷纭，各家学说竟多达十余种，彼此扞格。其中最合乎罗马法正解的一套，是汉堡的特雷克尔先生所提出、又经胡果先生进一步发挥的说法；胡果曾在《民法杂志》（Magazine of Civil Law）第二卷第7页加以撮述。此说如今已几近举世公认。Res mancipi（系 res mancipii 的缩写，即“要式物”），指其绝对所有权（Jus Quiritium，奎里蒂法所有权）唯有经由上述庄严程式、至少须经要式买卖（mancipatio）方能取得之物——要式买卖无疑是其中最简便、最常用的一种。见盖尤斯第二卷25节。至于其余物件，其取得无须这些程式即可授予绝对权利，则称为 res nec mancipi（略式物）。参见乌尔比安《残篇》第十九题1、3、7节。乌尔比安与瓦罗都曾一一列举要式物的种类，两人所列不尽相符，后人也尝试用种种办法加以调和。不过乌尔比安是以法学家身份著述的，在这个问题上，他的说法理应更有分量。但为什么唯独这些物件才算要式物？这是被争论得最多、法学家分歧最大的问题之一。胡果先生的解答最为自然妥帖：“凡是逐一易于辨认、价值高昂、罗马人所熟悉且极为看重的物件，皆属要式物。古时取得此类物件之所以须经要式买卖或别的庄严程式，正因其重要；而要式买卖又能证明其取得，因为这些物件彼此易于分辨。”关于这场重大的史学争论，可参阅胡果《民法杂志》第二卷第37、38页；察哈里埃（J. M. Zachariae）的专论 de Rebus Mancipi et nec Mancipi Conjecturae（《要式物与略式物臆解》，第11页，Lipsiae，1807年）；胡果的《民法史》；以及拙著 Institutiones Juris Romani Privati（《罗马私法要义》，第108、110页）。作为通则，可以说一切物件都是略式物（res nec mancipi），要式物（res mancipi）不过是这一原则的例外。裁判官改变了这套财产制度：他们准许“事实持有”（in bonis）某物之人，在取得时效尚未届满、绝对所有权尚未确立之前，即有权追回其物（此即 Pauliana in rem actio，“保利之对物之诉”）。到查士丁尼时，罗马公民与外邦人之间早已不再有分别，他更进一步：无论以所谓市民法的取得方式、还是自然法的取得方式所取得之物，他一概准许追回。见《法典》第七卷第25、31题。他还在自己的《法学阶梯》（第二卷第1节）中，把盖尤斯的理论改得面目全非，以致那位法学家所传的学说竟无迹可寻。—W
141 ↩
See the Institutes (l. i. tit. iv. v.) and the Pandects, (l. vii.) Noodt has composed a learned and distinct treatise de Usufructu, (Opp. tom. i. p. 387—478.)
参见《法学阶梯》（第一卷第四、五题）与《学说汇纂》（第七卷）。诺特著有一篇精博而清晰的专论《论用益权》（de Usufructu，《文集》第一卷第387—478页）。
142 ↩
The questions de Servitutibus are discussed in the Institutes (l. ii. tit. iii.) and Pandects, (l. viii.) Cicero (pro Murena, c. 9) and Lactantius (Institut. Divin. l. i. c. i.) affect to laugh at the insignificant doctrine, de aqua de pluvia arcenda, &c. Yet it might be of frequent use among litigious neighbors, both in town and country.
关于地役权（de Servitutibus）的诸问题，见《法学阶梯》（第二卷第三题）与《学说汇纂》（第八卷）。西塞罗（《为穆雷纳辩护》第9章）与拉克坦提乌斯（《神圣原理》第一卷第一章）都故作姿态，讥笑那套无关宏旨的“排拒雨水之法”（de aqua pluvia arcenda）等等；然而无论城乡，好讼的邻里之间，它却常有用武之地。
143 ↩
Among the patriarchs, the first-born enjoyed a mystic and spiritual primogeniture, (Genesis, xxv. 31.) In the land of Canaan, he was entitled to a double portion of inheritance, (Deuteronomy, xxi. 17, with Le Clerc’s judicious Commentary.)
在希伯来族长时代，长子享有一种神秘而属灵的长子名分（《创世记》二十五章31节）。在迦南地，他有权继承双份的家业（《申命记》二十一章17节，并见勒克莱尔精当的注释）。
144 ↩
At Athens, the sons were equal; but the poor daughters were endowed at the discretion of their brothers. See the pleadings of Isaeus, (in the viith volume of the Greek Orators,) illustrated by the version and comment of Sir William Jones, a scholar, a lawyer, and a man of genius.
在雅典，诸子地位平等；可怜的女儿们却只能听凭兄弟们的意思分给一份妆奁。参见伊塞乌斯的诉状（载《希腊演说家文集》第七卷），威廉·琼斯爵士为之作了译文与注解——他既是学者，又是律师，还是一位天才。
145 ↩
In England, the eldest son also inherits all the land; a law, says the orthodox Judge Blackstone, (Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. ii. p. 215,) unjust only in the opinion of younger brothers. It may be of some political use in sharpening their industry.
在英格兰，长子同样承袭全部田产；恪守正统的布莱克斯通法官（《英格兰法释义》第二卷第215页）说，这条法律只有在弟弟们看来才算不公。它或许还有几分政治上的用处——能磨砺弟弟们的勤奋。
146 ↩
Blackstone’s Tables (vol. ii. p. 202) represent and compare the decrees of the civil with those of the canon and common law. A separate tract of Julius Paulus, de gradibus et affinibus, is inserted or abridged in the Pandects, (l. xxxviii. tit. x.) In the viith degrees he computes (No. 18) 1024 persons.
布莱克斯通的图表（第二卷第202页）胪列并比较了市民法、教会法与普通法各自的规定。尤利乌斯·保卢斯另有一篇专论《论亲等与姻亲》（de gradibus et affinibus），全文或节略收入《学说汇纂》（第三十八卷第十题）。他算出，到第七亲等时（第18目）共有1024人。
147 ↩
The Voconian law was enacted in the year of Rome 584. The younger Scipio, who was then 17 years of age, (Frenshemius, Supplement. Livian. xlvi. 40,) found an occasion of exercising his generosity to his mother, sisters, &c. (Polybius, tom. ii. l. xxxi. p. 1453—1464, edit Gronov., a domestic witness.)
《沃科尼亚法》颁行于罗马建城584年。当时年方17岁的小西庇阿（弗伦斯海米乌斯《李维补遗》第四十六卷40节），借此机会对自己的母亲、姊妹等人大加慷慨（波利比乌斯《历史》第二卷第三十一卷第1453—1464页，格罗诺维乌斯校本；他是这一家事的亲历见证者）。
148 ↩
Legem Voconiam (Ernesti, Clavis Ciceroniana) magna voce bonis lateribus (at lxv. years of age) suasissem, says old Cato, (de Senectute, c. 5,) Aulus Gellius (vii. 13, xvii. 6) has saved some passages.
老加图说：“Legem Voconiam（见埃内斯蒂《西塞罗辞典》Clavis Ciceroniana）magna voce bonis lateribus（时年65岁）suasissem”——意即“我本可以放开嗓门、鼓足肺气，为《沃科尼亚法》大声疾呼”（《论老年》第5章）。奥卢斯·革利乌斯（《阿提卡之夜》第七卷13节、第十七卷6节）保存了其中若干段落。
149 ↩
See the law of succession in the Institutes of Caius, (l. ii. tit. viii. p. 130—144,) and Justinian, (l. iii. tit. i.—vi., with the Greek version of Theophilus, p. 515-575, 588—600,) the Pandects, (l. xxxviii. tit. vi.—xvii.,) the Code, (l. vi. tit. lv.—lx.,) and the Novels, (cxviii.)
关于继承法，参见盖尤斯《法学阶梯》（第二卷第八题，第130—144页）与查士丁尼《法学阶梯》（第三卷第一至六题，并塞奥菲鲁斯的希腊文译本，第515—575、588—600页）、《学说汇纂》（第三十八卷第六至十七题）、《法典》（第六卷第五十五至六十题），以及《新律》（第118则）。
150 ↩
That succession was the rule, testament the exception, is proved by Taylor, (Elements of Civil Law, p. 519-527,) a learned, rambling, spirited writer. In the iid and iiid books, the method of the Institutes is doubtless preposterous; and the Chancellor Daguesseau (Oeuvres, tom. i. p. 275) wishes his countryman Domat in the place of Tribonian. Yet covenants before successions is not surely the natural order of civil laws.
继承为常例、遗嘱为例外，这一点泰勒已加证明（《民法要义》第519—527页）——此人博学而芜杂，笔下却有生气。《法学阶梯》第二、三卷的编排，其体例无疑荒唐失当；达盖索大法官（《文集》第一卷第275页）便恨不得让他的同胞多马取特里波尼安而代之。然而把“契约”排在“继承”之前，终究不像是民法应有的自然次序。
151 ↩
Prior examples of testaments are perhaps fabulous. At Athens a childless father only could make a will, (Plutarch, in Solone, tom. i. p. 164. See Isaeus and Jones.)
更早的遗嘱例证或许都属子虚。在雅典，唯有膝下无子之人才能立遗嘱（普鲁塔克《梭伦传》第一卷第164页；并见伊塞乌斯与琼斯）。
152 ↩
The testament of Augustus is specified by Suetonius, (in August, c. 101, in Neron. c. 4,) who may be studied as a code of Roman antiquities. Plutarch (Opuscul. tom. ii. p. 976) is surprised. The language of Ulpian (Fragment. tit. xx. p. 627, edit. Schulting) is almost too exclusive—solum in usu est.
奥古斯都的遗嘱，苏埃托尼乌斯有详载（《奥古斯都传》第101章、《尼禄传》第4章）——此人的著作简直可当作罗马掌故的一部法典来研读。普鲁塔克（《杂论》第二卷第976页）对此深感讶异。乌尔比安的措辞（《残篇》第二十题，第627页，斯胡尔廷校本）则几乎失之绝对——solum in usu est（“唯此一法通行于世”）。
153 ↩
Justinian (Novell. cxv. No. 3, 4) enumerates only the public and private crimes, for which a son might likewise disinherit his father. Note: Gibbon has singular notions on the provisions of Novell. cxv. 3, 4, which probably he did not clearly understand.—W
查士丁尼（《新律》第115则第3、4目）仅列举了那些公罪与私罪，凭这些罪名，儿子同样可以剥夺父亲的继承权。按：吉本对《新律》第115则第3、4目的规定有些奇特的理解，多半是没有真正弄懂。—W
154 ↩
The substitutions of fidei-commissaires of the modern civil law is a feudal idea grafted on the Roman jurisprudence, and bears scarcely any resemblance to the ancient fidei-commissa, (Institutions du Droit Francois, tom. i. p. 347-383. Denissart, Decisions de Jurisprudence, tom. iv. p. 577-604.) They were stretched to the fourth degree by an abuse of the clixth Novel; a partial, perplexed, declamatory law.
近代民法中的“信托替补继承”（substitutions fidéicommissaires），乃是嫁接到罗马法学之上的一种封建观念，与古代的 fidei-commissa（信托遗赠）几乎毫无相似之处（《法兰西法制》Institutions du Droit Francois 第一卷第347—383页；德尼萨尔《法学判例》Decisions de Jurisprudence 第四卷第577—604页）。滥用《新律》第159则的结果，这种替补竟被拉长到第四代——那真是一条偏私、纠缠而空泛的法律。
155 ↩
Dion Cassius (tom. ii. l. lvi. p. 814, with Reimar’s Notes) specifies in Greek money the sum of 25,000 drachms.
狄奥·卡西乌斯（《罗马史》第二卷第五十六卷第814页，并赖马尔的注释）以希腊货币折算，指明其数额为25,000德拉克马。
156 ↩
The revolutions of the Roman laws of inheritance are finely, though sometimes fancifully, deduced by Montesquieu, (Esprit des Loix, l. xxvii.)
罗马继承法历经的种种变迁，孟德斯鸠（《论法的精神》第二十七卷）梳理得十分精彩，虽说有时不免流于臆想。
157 ↩
Of the civil jurisprudence of successions, testaments, codicils, legacies, and trusts, the principles are ascertained in the Institutes of Caius, (l. ii. tit. ii.—ix. p. 91—144,) Justinian, (l. ii. tit. x.—xxv.,) and Theophilus, (p. 328—514;) and the immense detail occupies twelve books (xxviii.—xxxix.) of the Pandects.] III. The general duties of mankind are imposed by their public and private relations: but their specific obligations to each other can only be the effect of, 1. a promise, 2. a benefit, or 3. an injury: and when these obligations are ratified by law, the interested party may compel the performance by a judicial action. On this principle, the civilians of every country have erected a similar jurisprudence, the fair conclusion of universal reason and justice. [^44.158
关于继承、遗嘱、遗嘱附录、遗赠与信托的民事法理，其原则可稽于盖尤斯《法学阶梯》（第二卷第二至九题，第91—144页）、查士丁尼《法学阶梯》（第二卷第十至二十五题）与塞奥菲鲁斯（第328—514页）；至于其浩繁的细目，则占去《学说汇纂》整整十二卷（第二十八至三十九卷）。]三、人类的一般义务由其公共与私人的关系所加诸；但人与人之间具体的义务，只能出于三者之一：一、允诺，二、恩惠，三、损害。而一旦这些义务经法律认可，利害相关的一方便可借司法诉讼强制对方履行。基于这一原则，各国的法学家都建立起大同小异的法理体系，此乃普世的理性与正义所导出的公允结论。[^44.158
158
The Institutes of Caius, (l. ii. tit. ix. x. p. 144—214,) of Justinian, (l. iii. tit. xiv.—xxx. l. iv. tit. i.—vi.,) and of Theophilus, (p. 616—837,) distinguish four sorts of obligations—aut re, aut verbis, aut literis aut consensu: but I confess myself partial to my own division. Note: It is not at all applicable to the Roman system of contracts, even if I were allowed to be good.—M.
盖尤斯《法学阶梯》（第二卷第九、十题，第144—214页）、查士丁尼《法学阶梯》（第三卷第十四至三十题、第四卷第一至六题）与塞奥菲鲁斯（第616—837页），都把债分为四类——aut re, aut verbis, aut literis, aut consensu（“或因物，或因言辞，或因文书，或因合意”）；不过我承认，自己偏爱采用我本人的分类。按：吉本这一分法根本不适用于罗马的契约体系——即便姑且承认它本身站得住脚，亦复如此。—M